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THE CITIZEN INFORMANT DOCTRINE
JAMES R. THOMPSON* AND GARY L. STARKMAN**
There is, perhaps, no language in the Constitu-
tion that has given the courts more difficulty than
the fourth amendment's command that "no war-
rant shall issue, but upon probable cause." The
pages of precedent are literally covered with judi-
cial attempts to interpret this phrase so as to strike
a balance between the legitimate needs of law en-
forcement and the right of the citizenry to be free
from unreasonable interferences with privacy and
unfounded charges of crime. However, since the
Supreme Court first held that warrants may not
issue upon mere suspicion but must be supported
by facts amounting to probable cause,' there has
been continuous debate over the degree of speci-
ficity necessary to secure a search warrant. One
school of thought suggests that the Supreme Court
has gone too far in creating a rigid, academic
formula that is not only incomprehensible to police
officers, but too technical for judges to apply with
any degree of consistency.2 On the other hand,
there are those who maintain that a citizen is not
secure from unjustified intrusions upon privacy un-
less the police comply with exacting standards of
factual specificity before obtaining a search war-
rant.'
A focal point of confrontation between these di-
vergent viewpoints concerns the extent to which
an application for a search warrant based on hear-
say information must demonstrate the reliability
of the individual providing the information. Con-
cededly, many warrant applications are based on
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I See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
2 See generally Carrington, Speaking for the Police,
61 J. Cane. L.C. & P.S. 244 (1970); T. TAYLOR, Two
SUDnrs mi CoNsntTIonAL I-TERPnETATIOx 23-24
(1969).
3See generally Comment, Search and Seizure in the
Supreme Court: Shadows of the Fourth Amendment, 28
U. Car. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). Cf. W. SCHAEPR,
THE SuspzcT AN SocirEY (1966).
information provided by sources whose character
and motives dictate a valid judicial concern for an
informant's reliability. However, in light of this
concern, the courts may well have overreacted by
developing an inflexible rule structure for the
quantum of information about the informant's re-
liability that should be contained in an application
for a search warrant. As a surface matter, the
rigidity of existing rules would seem to require that
all information provided the police be tested by the
same reliability standards. But it is anomalous that
similar reliability considerations should exist when
a warrant is sought on the basis of information pro-
vided by a citizen who is the victim of, or witness
to, a crime, as when, for example, the classic "stool
pigeon" provides information. To the extent that
law enforcement officers must meticulously demon-
strate the reliability of the citizen informant and
the "stool pigeon" in the same technical way, time
and effort are needlessly expended and, where tech-
nical requirements are not met, reliable evidence is
needlessly excluded.
This article will focus on a concept in the em-
bryonic stages of development-the citizen in-
formant doctrine-which has been accepted in vary-
ing degrees in some jurisdictions and represents a
solution to the problem suggested above. Briefly
stated, this doctrine permits the issuance of a search
warrant on the basis of information supplied by an
ordinary citizen who observes the commission of a
crime without regard to particularized considera-
tions of reliability. Before attempting to articulate
and crystallize the doctrine, it is necessary to place
it in the historical context of the fourth amend-
emnt cases.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in fourth
amendment cases "point in differing directions and
differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make them
all perfectly consistent."4 However, the Court has
consistently emphasized that, wherever possible,
searches should be conducted pursuant to a warrant
so that a neutral and detached judicial officer is
4 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483
(1971). See La Fave, Search and Seizure, "The Course
of Trite Law... Has Not ... Run Smooth", 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 255.
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interposed between the officer and his suspect.5 In
addition to its preference for the use of search war-
rants, the Court has attempted to insure that the
magistrate's function is more than that of a "rub-
ber stamp" for the law enforcement officer. 6 The
issuing officer is compelled to make an independent
evaluation of the reliability of the facts put forth
by the complaining officer. Under no circumstances
can he rely upon "a mere affirmation of suspicion
and belief without any statement of adequate sup-
porting facts."
7
The function of the magistrate became more
delicate with the abolition of the requirement, im-
posed by some courts,8 that the complaining officer
possess personal knowledge of facts amounting to
a criminal offense. The demise of that doctrine with
respect to warrantless arrests 9 opened the way for
- See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 449-51 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).6 But compare W. LA FAvE, ARREST: TiE DxcisioN
To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 502-03 (1965):
The assumption apparently is that greater pro-
tection for the individual is afforded by the warrant
procedure, since an arrest will be made only if an
impartial judicial officer, upon careful evaluation
of the evidence presented to him, determines that
adequate grounds for an arrest exist. But, at least
in [some states] it is clear that the warrant process
does not serve this function. Rather, the decision is
made in the office of the prosecutor and the judge
routinely signs the arrest warrant without any
independent inquiry into the facts and circum-
stances of the individual case.
See also Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the
Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964
WAsir. U.L.Q. 1, 17.
7 Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933).
The standards used to test for probable cause are the
same whether a search warrant, as in Nathanson, or an
arrest warrant is being sought. See, e.g., Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958); United States
v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 n.2 (7th Cir. 1967). Cf.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (standard of
probable cause necessary to arrest without a warrant
is essentially the same). Because of this identity,
authorities involving all of these factual situations will
be used interchangeably when reference is made to their
common legal principles.
8 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85, 88
(8th Cir. 1927); Wagner v. United States, 8 F.2d 581
(8th Cir. 1925); Giles v. United States, 284 F.208
(1st Cir. 1922); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp.
275, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1944); Reeve v. Howe, 33 F. Supp.
619, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1940). Compare Mueller v. Powell,
203 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Bianco,
189 F.2d 716 (3rd Cir. 1951); United States v. Heitner,
149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945); Wisniewski v. United
States, 47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931).
9 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 n.4
(1959), vesting police officers with power to arrest upon
probable cause generated by hearsay information, was
presaged by Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
172-74 (1949). See also McCray v. fllinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967).
the Court to hold that warrants could issue upon
hearsay information, 0 which, in turn, created the
need for criteria by which a magistrate could test
the reliability of the hearsay information. Thus
arose the Court's controversial decision in Aguilar
V. Texas."
In Aguilar two Houston police officers applied
for a warrant to search a home for narcotics on the
basis of "reliable information from a credible per-
son." Finding the exposition far too conclusory to
warrant a magistrate's finding of probable cause,
Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion articulated the now
famous two-pronged test to be used by magistrates
in assessing the sufficiency of information intended
to produce a warrant. As a constitutional yard-
stick for evaluating hearsay in a warrant appli-
cation, the magistrate, said the Court, had to be
informed of (1) some of the underlying circum-
stances relied upon by the person providing the
affiant with information and (2) some of the cir-
cumstances indicating that the person supplying
the information to the affiant was credible or his
information reliable.
12
After observing the reaction to its decision in
Aguilar,3 the Court, counseled by experience, ac-
cepted review of the Eighth Circuit's divided en
banc determination in United States v. Spinelli.14
The affadavit in question asserted that the F.B.I.
had observed Spinelli going to an apartment con-
taining two telephones and that an informer had
said that Spinelli was conducting a gambling opera-
tion using two telephones with certain numbers,
which matched the numbers of the phones in the
apartment Spinelli had visited. The Supreme
Court, in Spinelli v. United States,15 reversed the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the affadavit was
sufficient to establish probable cause.
10 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71
(1960).
11373 U.S. 108 (1964).
'2Id. at 114.
'3 See, e.g., United States v. Pinkerman, 374 F.2d 988
(4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d
459 (2d Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d
833 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354
Mass. 337, 237 N.E.2d 53 (1968); Ludwig v. State,
215 So. 2d 898 (Fla. App. 1968); Comment, Informers
Word as Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts,
53 CALrx. L. R1v. 840 (1965).
'4382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc). Mr.
Justice Blackmun, a member of the Eighth Circuit
majority which upheld the warrant in Spinelli, remains
firm in his belief that the circuit court's opinion was cor-
rect and that the Supreme Court erred in reversing. See
Harris v. United States, 403 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1971)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
1 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the
plurality opinion in which three of his brethren joined.
Justices Black, Fortas and Stewart issued separate
[Vol. 64
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Rather than clarify the law in this area, the
Court's splintered decision in Spinelli only served
to complicate and confuse the situation. While it
is difficult to extract any clearly focused principles
of law from the opinion, the decision, on its facts,
seemed to elevate the evidentiary standards neces-
sary to satisfy Aguilar's dual criteria. The plurality
opinion found the detail set forth in the affidavit,
even though partially corroborated, insufficient
under Aguilar because the information disclosed
no more than a series of innocent acts coupled with
a naked conclusion of criminal activity. However,
since Draper v. United States 6 had previously up-
held a warrantless arrest based upon an inform-
ant's tip which, while disclosing nothing particu-
larly sinister, was so detailed as to be self-verifying,
the Court went to great lengths to distinguish
Draper in terms of the amount of detail provided by
the informant. Consequently, the evidentiary de-
tail which, pursuant to Spineli, must be provided
the magistrate before he could constitutionally
discharge his function, according to Mr. Justice
Black, "expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable
proportions.' 7
The antimony presented by the self-verifying in-
formation notions of Draper and the elaborate
specificity required under Spineli's evidentiary
expansion of the Aguilar doctrine made it "perhaps
not the easiest task for a lower court to walk the
logical tightrope of Draper-Aguilar-Spinelli".5
In this context of judicial confusion, an individual
named Roosevelt Harris was convicted for possess-
ing non-taxpaid liquor. The verdict was primarily
secured by evidence obtained pursuant to a search
warrant and, therefore, his appeal to the Sixth
Circuit concerned only the sufficiency of the affa-
davit upon which the warrant was predicated.
dissents. Justice Marshall did not participate. The
pivotal vote was Justice White's concurrence which was
premised upon a somewhat dubious foundation:
Pending full-scale reconsideration of [Draper],
on the one hand, or of the Nahanson-Aguilar cases
on the other, I join the opinion of the Court and
the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to
affirm would produce an equally divided Court.
Id. at 429.
16 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
17 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
18 United States v. Mitchell 425 F.2d 1353, 1360
(8th Cir. 1970) (Blackmun, J.3. In Mitchell, Justice
Blackmun, then Circuit Judge, first expressed dis-
enchantment with the Supreme Court's disposition of
Spindli and, by relying upon Draper, saw a means of
avoiding Spindli's rigors. As to the tension between
Draper and Aguilar-Spinelli, see Note, The Informer's
Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL.
L. Rnv. 958 (1969).
In a per curiam opinion, the Sixth Circuit, rely-
ing on the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis, reversed the
conviction. 9 That court found that the first prong
of Aguilar was satisfied because the hearsay de-
clarant visually observed the facts asserted 0
However, the second requirement of Aguilar-a
basis for confirming the out-of-court declarant's
credibility-was held to be lacking. The issue came
to the Supreme Court in this posture.
With Chief Justice Burger writing the plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Cir-
cuit" and indicated a willingness to take into ac-
count the totality of the circumstances under
which the warrant was issued.m This willingness
was manifested by a resurrection of the "substan-
tial basis" test enuciated by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Jones v. United States. Thus, under
Harris, the affidavit must be considered as a whole
to determine whether the informant's report,
19 United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.
1969).
"0 Generally, where personal observation of a crime
occurs, the first prong of the Aguilar test is satisfied
and the question is reduced to whether the informant
is credible or his information reliable. See e.g., United
States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1997); Coyne v.
Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235 (S.D. Ohio 1967); State v.
Snyder, 12 Ariz. App. 142, 468 P.2d 593 (1970); People
v. Scoma, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419 (1969);
Sturgeon v. State, 483 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App.
1971); Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176
S.E.2d 309 (1970).
2L403 U.S. 573 (1971). The Chief Justice's opinion
was divided into three parts, holding that: (1) a factual
basis for deeming the informant reliable existed; (2)
Spinell was wrong in failing to take into account the
affiant's knowledge of a suspect's reputation; and (3)
declarations against penal interest by an informant are
indicia of reliability. Justice Black, who would have
overruled Aguilar and Spinelli, and Justice Blackmun,
who would have overruled Spinelli, concurred in all
threeparts of the opinion. Justice Stewart concurred in
Part Iand Justice White, the pivotal vote in Spinelli
concurred in Part III. Justice Harlan, who authored
Spinelli, wrote for the four dissenters.
22 Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in Spineli that
"the 'totality of the circumstances' approach.., paints
with too broad a brush," 393 U.S. at 415, was, thereby,
implicitly rejected.
23362 U.S. 257, 271-72 (1960):
We conclude therefore that hearsay may be the
basis for a warrant. We cannot say that there was
so little basis for accepting the hearsay here that
the Commissioner acted improperly. The Com-
missioner need not have been convinced of the
presence of narcotics in the apartment. He might
have found the affidavit insufficient and withheld
his warrant. But there was substantial basis for him
to conclude that narcotics were probably present
in the apartment, and that is sufficient.
We have decided that, as hearsay alone does not
render an affidavit insufficient, the Commissioner
need not have required the informants or their
affidavits to be produced ... so long as there was
a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
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coupled with the corroborating information, pro-
vides a "substantial basis" upon which to determine
the existence of probable cause.24
While some commentators have interpreted
Harris' "substantial basis" approach to have un-
dermined the mechanical tests of Aguilar or, at
least, to have obfuscated the line between its
prongs, 25 it is doubtful that the Court went so far.
Rather, since there was no dispute that the de-
tailed personal observation provided by the Harris
informant was sufficient to satisfy the first A guilar
test,26 the issue was reduced to the quantum of in-
formation necessary to establish the informant's
credibility. Although Aguilar was not abandoned,
the Court apparently reduced the burden for satis-
fying the second prong of the test to a standard less
exacting than that envisioned by Spinelli. The
Chief Justice, relying heavily upon a number of pre-
Spinelli decisions, suggested a more flexible ap-
proach to examining probable cause affidavits
which would avoid "hypertechnicality" and rely
upon "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act."n7
Because the affadavit held valid in Harris would
probably have been rejected under a literal reading
of Spinelli28 it is not unreasonable to assume that
the thrust of Harris was to relax the elaborate
specificity required by Spinelli to satisfy the second
prong of the Aguilar test. One court has clearly
stated that "while adhering in general to the
Aguilar decision, the Supreme Court clearly indi-
cated the burden for satisfying the so-called second
prong of Aguilar was not as stringent as Spinelli
had indicated." 29 Upon this thesis, the courts, both
24403 U.S. at 581.
21 See, e.g., Note, 40 FoRDIAM L.RFv. 687, 696 n.61
(1972); Note, 47 Nom D~r; LAWYER 632, 638 (1972).2
6 Compare 403 U.S. at 578-79 vith 403 U.S. at 589
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Harlan found
the information sufficient to satisfy the first test, he
specifically rejected the notion that it was so detailed
as to be self-verifying. Id. at 593.
27 403 U.S. at 583. In reaching this conclusion the
Chief Justice relied upon and quoted Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) and United
States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). More-
over, he expressly adopted the language of Mr. Justice
Fortas' dissent in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 438, to the
extent that it indicates that "[a] policeman's affidavit
should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest."
403 U.S. at 579.
28 See The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HAIv. L.
REv. 3, 56 (1971).
29 United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1286 (7th
Cir. 1972), petition for cert. docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3575
(U.S. April 3, 1973). See alse United States v. McNally,
-F.2d-(lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Sequella-
state0 and federal, 3' have given credence to the
teachings of Harris insofar as it concerns the quan-
tum of information necessary to satisfy the reli-
ability of the informant prong of Aguilar.n
While Harris concededly did not depart from the
long line of cases voiding warrants procured on the
basis of mere suspicions,n it did signal an abandon-
ment of the rigidity of technical nicety in the review
of affadavits for warrants. Therefore, contempo-
rary warrant applications must be tested upon pre-
Spinelli common sense considerations of practical
accuracy. Concluding the Harris opinion, Chief
Justice Burger stated that "tilt will not do to say
that warrants may not issue on uncorroborated
hearsay. This only avoids the issues of whether there
is reason for crediting the out-of-court statement.' 'u
By holding that reason for crediting the hearsay
statements of informers could exist without the
elaborate specificity deemed necessary under
Spinelli, the Harris decision paved the road toward
total acceptance of the innovative citizen-inform-
ant concept that has been discussed and applied in
some jurisdictions, but never fully articulated and
accepted on a national scale.
At the outset, it must be recognized that the
question of whether citizen informants must be
shown to be reliable in the same way and to the
same extent as a police informant is of more than
academic significance. One of the prime methods
used to demonstrate reliability of an informant is
to show that the informant has furnished accurate
Avendo, 447 F.2d 575, 579 n.18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971). That the effect of Harris upon the
Aguilar-Spinelli doctrine is by no means clear is evi-
denced by the three separate opinions in United States
v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
30 See, e.g., State v. Perry, 59 N.J. 383, 390, 283 A.2d
330, 334 n.3 (1971); State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App.
487, 492, 183 S.E.2d 820, 822-23 (1971); Pierce v.
State, 491 P.2d 335, 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
State v. Curtis, 489 P.2d 962 (Ore. App. 1971).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Guinn, 454 F.2d 29,
33-35 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Roman, 451
F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Di
Rienzo v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228, 230 (3rd Cir. 1971).3
1
2 A review of the Harris decision, indicating that the
"Supreme Court dealt harshly with the standard of proof
that had evolved under Aguilar and Spinelli, seemingly
altering its content," is set forth in an analogous context
in Comment, Controverting Probable Cause In Facially
Sufficient Affidavits, 63 J.Cimu.L.C. & P.S. 41, 43-44
(1972).
1 See, e.g., Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). Cf. Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
34403 U.S. at 584.
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information in the past. However, the citizen in-
formant
usually would not have more than one opportunity
to supply information to the police, thereby pre-
cluding proof of his reliability by pointing to
previous accurate information which he has sup-
plied.n
Thus, if the same rules which apply to proving the
reliability of police informants apply to citizen in-
formants, the affiant is faced with the difficult task
of demonstrating reliability in other ways. 6
The citizen-informant doctrine, which would
avoid this anomaly, is predicated upon the fact
that very different credibility considerations exist
when warrants are issued upon information sup-
plied by an ordinary citizen as opposed to an
anonymous police informant. Police informants,
for the most part, receive something in exchange
for the information they supply, be it money or
favorable consideration in connection with a
charge pending against them. Since the police in-
formant's information is self-serving, it must be
considered suspect; and, therefore, before a search
warrant can be issued upon such information, the
judicial officer must be advised of some of the
underlying reasons from which the affiant con-
cluded that the informant was reliable. However,
where an ordinary citizen supplies the information,
there is no reason, for deeming the information
self-serving or suspect and, therefore, a substantial
basis for crediting the out-of-court statement exists
by the mere fact that the information is furnished
by a citizen.
This distinction was clearly articulated by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Paszek.
[Ain ordinary citizen who reports a crime which
has been committed in his presence, or that a
crime is being or will be commited, stands on
much different ground than a police informer.
He is a witness to criminal activity who acts with
an intent to aid the police in law enforcement be-
cause of his concern for society or for his own
safety. He does not expect any gain or concession
in exchange for his information.
Thus, a citizen who acts openly in aid of law en-
"1 State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 630-31, 184
N.W.2d 836, 843 (1971).
36 Adair v. State, 482 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) illustrates the practical difficulty created for
both law enforcement officers and reviewing courts if
prior reliability cannot be used to show an informant's
reliability.
'750 Wis. 2d 619, 630, 184 N.W.2d 836, 843 (1971).
forcement when he reports crimes to the police
either automatically satisfies the reliability of the
informant prong of Aguilar or, as expressed in a
similar manner by the Illinois supreme court in
People v. Hoffman, 3 renders prior reliability un-
necessary.39
In Hoffman an unidentified citizen told police
officers that she had seen a man with a vulgarism
written on his forehead go into a restaurant. The
policemen went into the restaurant and were met
with resistance in attempting to make an arrest.
On appeal from a conviction for resisting arrest,
defendant's contention that no probable cause ex-
isted to arrest him was rejected. The police of-
ficers were justified in relying on the information
received from the woman because the standard
"requirement of prior reliability which must be
met when police act upon 'tips' from professional
informers does not apply to information supplied
by ordinary citizens."4
Perhaps the best rationale for considering citi-
zen-eyewitness information to be inherently reli-
able can be derived from the law of evidence.
The hearsay rule requires certain evidence to be
excluded at trial because it is thought to be
unreliable; but, by the same token, numerous
exceptions to the rule have been developed be-
cause certain kinds of hearsay evidence are in-
herently reliable.a4 Citizen-eyewitness information
generally takes a form similar to declarations
that fall within certain exceptions to the hearsay
rule and should, therefore, be accorded the same
respect in terms of reliability. Moreover, since
it is axiomatic that probable cause can be pre-
dicated upon evidence that would not necessarily
be admissible at trial,4' it seems clear that extra-
"845111l 2d 221, 258 N.E.2d. 326 (1970).
"9 Whether a citizen informer is automatically
deemed to satisfy the reliability prong of Aguilar or to
render the prong inapplicable is a distinction without a
substantive difference. While the former supports
strict adherence to the mechanical tests of Aguilar,
the latter seems less fictive. See United States v. Unger,
469 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972).
4045 Ill. 2d at 226, 258 N.E.2d at 328. Accord,
People v. Lewis, 240 Cal. App. 2d 546, 49 Cal. Rptr.
579 (1966); People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489, 237 N.E.2d
446 (1968), cerl. dismissed as improvidently granted,
397 U.S. 660 (1970).
415 J. WIGMOPE, EvDFcNC §1422, at 204 (3rd ed.
1940).
42 "There is a large difference between the two things
to be proved ... as well as between the tribunals which
determine them, and therefore a like difference in the
quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 (1959). See
also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 582 (1971);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
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judicial statements bearing attributes similar to
recognized hearsay exceptions are sufficiently re-
liable for purposes of probable cause.
The Chief Justice employed this rationale in
Harris to reach the conclusion that admissions
against penal interest, although perhaps not suffi-
ciently reliable to constitute evidenceat trial,"carry
their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least
to support a finding of probable cause to search."3
Since statements in the form of marginal hearsay
exceptions are sufficient to generate probable
cause, the reliability of information supplied to
police can be determined, as an analytical matter,
by resort to the rules of evidence. As the Chief
Justice emphasized in Harris, the statements need
not fall directly within a hearsay exception so as to
be competent trial evidence; but a statement that
carries its own "indicia of credibility" will suffice.
A recognized exception to the hearsay rule exists
where a statement is uttered under the stress of an
exciting event which suspends the powers of reflec-
tion and fabrication and, thereby, renders the
statement reliable." Three basic requirements must
be fulfilled, under Professor Wigmore's analysis,
before the "spontaneous exclamation" or, as some-
times termed, "excited utterance" hearsay excep-
tion becomes viable: (1) a startling event must
occur which shocks the declarant into a state of
nervous excitement and causes him to (2) make a
statement while under the stress of the event which
(3) relates to the circumstances of the event.4
While most information supplied to the police by
ordinary citizens falls within this strict definition,
a more precise study of the spontaneous exclama-
tion exception reveals that the doctrine is not so
stringent as the requirements appear. Thus, a brief
examination of each separate element of the excep-
tion, as interpreted by the courts, demonstrates
43 403 U.S. at 583. See also United States ex rel. Di
Rienzo v. Yeager, 443 F.2d 228, 230 (3rd Cir. 1971);
People v. Saiken, 49 Ill. 2d 504, 512, 275 N.E.2d 381,
386-87 (1971). The Chief Justice's use of declarations
against penal interest as an element of reliability was
foreshadowed by Justice White's comment that if "the
informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the
crime in the nature of admission against interest, the
affidavit giving this information should be held suffi-
cient." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425
(1969) (White, J., concurring).
4See C. McCOMuICK, EvmENcE §272, at 578-84
(1954); Hutchins & Slesinger, Spontaneous Exclama-
tions, 28 COLum. L. REv. 432 (1928).
46 6 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 41, at §1750. See also
United States v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 872 (6th Cir.
1965); Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.).
that a broad range of information provided police
officers comes within the perimeters of the analogy.
The initial requirement under the excited utter-
ance exception requires the perception of an event
which "might so excite and control the mind of the
speaker that his statements are natural and spon-
taneous and therefore, sincere and trustworthy"."
Neither Wig-more nor the case law limits the kind of
act or event capable of causing excitement to a par-
ticularized situation. Since a variety of events
which would be considered nonstartling in contrast
to the observation of a crime in progress have been
found sufficient to trigger the exception,4 it is un-
necessary for present purposes to review the
amorphous mass of case law involving events which
the courts considered startling.
The second element necessary to satisfy the ex-
cited utterance exception involves the time of the
declaration. "The utterance must have been before
there has been time to contrive and misrepresent."4
However, it is clear that the statements "need not
be strictly contemporaneous with the existing cause;
they may be subsequent to it, provided that there
has not been time for the exciting influence to lose
its sway and be dissipated. ' 49 While the cases on
the permissible time lag between the event and the
declaration are disparate," it is clear that "there
can beno definite and fixed limit of time .... Thus,
the application of the principle thus depends en-
tirely on the circumstances of each case". 51
Finally, Wigmore required the declaration to re-
late to the circumstances of the occurrence causing
it in order to be admissible as an excited utterance.
Although some cases have written this require-
ment away in the ordinary hearsay exception situa-
46McWilliams, The Admissibility of Spontaneous
Declarations, 21 CAmF. L. Rxv. 460, 464 (1933).47 See generally Comment, Spontaneous Exclamations
in the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 CoLwm. L. Rxv.
430 (1946).
48 6 J. WsicoRE, supra note 41, §1750, at 142 (em-
phasis in original).
49 Id. (emphasis in original). See also Morgan, The
Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HAxv. L. Xxv. 481,
574-76 (1946); Vicksburg & M.R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119
U.S. 99 (1886).
50 See, e.g., United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092
(5th Cir. 1972) (about an hour); Wheeler v. United
States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (within an hour);
Guthrie v. United States, 207 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1953)
(11 hours); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Heatfield,
141 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944) (1 hour and J hour re-
spectively for two statements); Bennett v. Bennett, 92
N.H. 379, 31 A.2d 374 (1943) (4 hours); State v. Smith,
200 S.C. 188, 20 S.E.2d 726 (1942) (30 minutes to 1j
hours).




tion," it would be an essentiality in considering the
reliability of information supplied by a citizen.
Since the event that raises the excitement should
be the subject of the ensuing warrant application,
it is necessary that the statement of the citizen to
police officials directly relate to what he ob-
served. But, it should be noted that the spon-
taneous exclamation exception has been applied to
statements made in response to interrogation where
the sway of the exciting event has not dissipated."
Thus, the reliability of information given in re-
sponse to police investigative work occurring im-
mediately after a crime has been committed should
likewise be considered reliable for warrant pur-
poses if, in response to a question, a citizen-eye-
witness provides information relating to the offense
under investigation.
Of course, it is difficult to compare the essential
features of a given hearsay exception to a citizen-
informant situation without assessing the particular
facts and circumstances under which the citizen
supplies information to the police. However, as a
theoretical matter, the analogy appears sound.
Moreover, as the law of evidence with respect to
the admissibility of hearsay at trial becomes in-
creasingly liberalized--apparently reflecting a
consensus that more kinds of hearsay evidence are
reliable--it does not seem unreasonable to broaden
the scope of information that will constitutionally
authorize the issuance of a warrant. Consistent
with the theory underlying exceptions to the hear-
2See, e.g., Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249
F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Tenzeno v. State, 484
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
"1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rummage, 359 Pa.
483, 486 59 A.2d 65, 67 (1948); General Schuyler Ins.
Co. v. Shustick, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 205, 207, 40 N.E.2d
485, 487 (Ohio App. 1941) (dictum).
UFD. R. Ev., 804(b) (2) (1971 Revised Draft) ex-
empts from the operation of the hearsay rule any
statement, not in response to the instigation of a
person engaged in investigating, litigating, or set-
tling a claim, which narrates, describes, or ex-
plains an event or condition recently perceived by
the declarant, made in good faith, not in contem-
plation of pending or anticipated litigation in which
he was interested, and while his recollection was
dear.
This rule represents a crystallization and extension of
the efforts of Wigmore and Morgan to create an orderly
analytic basis upon which to apply the chaotic--and
now outmoded--concept of res gestae. Since the prede-
termined reliability of evidence of this nature saves it
from a confrontation clause violation, cf. Duton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), information provided the
police, falling within the contours of the rule, should
certainly pass the reliability test of Aguilar in the
probable cause setting. However, by its own terms, it
would not apply to information elicited by police ques-
tioning.
say rule, information given to the police by those
who observe the commission of a crime, whether
victim or bystander, should be deemed sufficient to
generate probable cause to arrest and search. The
credence given such information rests in part upon
the common sense notion that a responsible citi-
zen, as opposed to a paid informant, will not disre-
gard the consequences of supplying inaccurate in-
formation to police.5
While the citizen-informant doctrine has not
been widely adopted, there appear to be no over-
whelming barriers to its judicial acceptance. Al-
though the cases do not generally articulate the
foregoing rationale, they do uniformly conclude
that, in situations involving on-the-scene apprehen-
sion of suspects, information supplied by citizen-
observers is sufficiently reliable to establish prob-
able cause. For example, in Chambers v. Maroneyfe a
gas station attendant gave the police a description
of the men who robbed him and two teenagers
identified an auto that they had seen speeding away
from a parking lot near the scene of the crime. The
Supreme Court concluded that "[h]aving talked to
the teenage observers and to the victim" the
police had "ample cause" to stop the auto and ar-
rest its occupants.7 Chambers' probable cause pro-
nouncement was followed in United States v.
Trotter,ss where a bartender who had cashed what
he believed to be a counterfeit bill alerted the
police and described the auto in which the de-
fendants were riding. The ensuing arrest and search
were found proper.
This line of cases is best exemplified by Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, when Circuit Judge, in
Brown v. United States. There, the police received
information from an unknown victim of a crime
which was radioed to other officers who, thereafter,
apprehended the defendant. To the defendant's
claim that the information was insufficient to estab-
lish probable cause, the Chief Justice forcefully re-
sponded:
Although the police could not here judge the re-
liability of the information on the basis of past
experience with the informant, the victim's report
has the virtue of being based on personal obser-
vation ... and is less likely to be colored by self-
interest than is that of an informant. Admittedly
a crime victim's observation may be faulty in some
35 See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra.
ss 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
57 Id. at 46.
"8 433 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
942 (1971).
59 365 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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respects, as it may have been here; however, the
mistakes are irrelevant if there is sufficient par-
ticularized information to constitute probable
cause. Except in those few cases where cameras are
part of a burglar alarm system, most reports are
likely to be less than perfect.6
Although the courts have not grounded their
decisions upon reliability of information expressed
in terms of hearsay exceptions such as spontaneous
exclamations, it is clear from the foregoing exam-
ples that information supplied by a citizen-eyewit-
ness is entitled to great weight in determining
probable cause.6' An ever-increasing number of
jurisdictions have therefore cast aside the custom-
ary analytical tools for determining probable cause
and have squarely embraced the citizen-informant
concept. In these jurisdictions, the reliability of the
individual supplying information to the police need
not be buttressed by supporting facts where it ap-
pears that he is a citizen outside the criminal en-
vironment.
The leading case on the subject appears to be
Peoplc v. Lewis,62 where a Mr. Owens witnessed a
burglary and identified a man on the street nearby
as the perpetrator of the offense. Holding the arrest
andl search of the person so identified to be proper,
the California Court of Appeals reasoned that the
only alternatives available to the police officer at
the moment were to place credence in the citizen's
information or allow the suspect to flee. Since the
latter alternative was highly undesirable if any
credence could be given to the citizen's information,
the court analyzed the various differences between
"stool pigeons" and citizens in terms of measuring
the reliability of their information. It concluded by
upholding the arrest and search on the ground that
the tests of reliability which must be applied to
ordinary police informants "are not necessarily ap-
61 Id. at 979.
61 See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99
(1967) (cab drivers who responded to shouts of "hold-
up" notified police); Keeny v. Swanson, 458 F.2d 680,
683 (8th Cir. 1972) (gas station attendant gave police
description of auto); Coleman v. United States, 420
F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (bank employee gave descrip-
tion of bank robbers' get-away car); Lewis v. United
States, 417 F.2d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (gas station
attendant who observed robbery of liquor store notified
police); Daniels v. United States, 393 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (victim of purse snatcher gave assailant's
description); Dailey v. United States, 365 F.2d 640
(10th Cir. 1966) (shop owner who received counterfeit
bill saw defendant later in the evening and notified
police); United States v. Jones, 340 F.2d 913, 914 (7th
Cir. 1964) (citizen halted police and told them that
two men seated in a parked car were waiting to kill him).
62 240 Cal. App. 2d 546, 49 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1966).
plicable to every citizen who assists the police." 6
Since Lewis, the California courts have articulated
the citizen-informant concept as black letter law:
"A citizen who purports to be a victim of or to have
witnessed a crime is a reliable informant even
though his reliability has not theretofore been
proved or tested.6
A great number of other jurisdictions have fol-
lowed California's lead in holding that information
supplied by a citizen is automatically reliable.
These cases are generally predicated upon the
ground that a citizen who supplies such information
has nothing to gain-and perhaps something to
lose-by so acting, that his personal observations
can be trusted because of the absence of a motive to
falsify, that ordinary citizens generally have no
previous transactions with the police disclosing
prior reliability, and that activity in the aid of law
enforcement should be encouraged. Consequently,
where an ordinary citizen offers information about
criminal activity, a warrant may issue or an arrest
ensue without a factual basis for deeming the
informant reliable.
65
The federal courts, while recognizing the states'
increasing acceptance of the citizen-informant
doctrine6 6 have proceeded somewhat differently.
The federal cases have distinguished the classical
police informant from the ordinary eyewitness for
purposes of the reliability criterion of Aguilar and
Spinelli, and have placed emphasis upon the
automatic reliability of an eyewitness, whether
victim, bystander or accomplice, with only passing
regard for the underlying factors which the states
find to enhance the ordinary citizen's reliability.
United States v. Bell67 specifically ditinguished the
eyewitness situation from that of the police in-
6
3Id. at 550, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
r People v. Bevins, 6 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 876, 879 (1970). See also People v. Hogan, 71 Cal.
2d 888, 80 Cal. Rptr. 28, 457 P.2d 868 (1969); People v.
Gardner, 252 Cal. App. 2d 320, 60 Cal. Rptr. 321
(1967); People v. Griffin, 250 Cal. App. 2d 545, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1967).
65 See, e.g., People v. Glubman, 485 P.2d 711 (Colo.
1971); State v. Mazzadora, 28 Conn. Supp. 252, 258
A.2d 310, 315 (1969); Walker v. State, 196 So. 2d 8
(Fla. App. 1967); People v. Hoffman, 45 Ill. 2d 221, 258
N.E.2d 446 (1968), People v. Hester, 39 Ill. 2d 489,
237 N.E.2d 446 (1968), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 397 U.S. 660 (1970); Yantis v. State, 476
S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Brown v. Com-
monwealth, 212 Va. 672, 187 S.E.2d 160 (1972); Guze-
wicz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 730, 187 S.E.2d 144
(1972); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 184 N.W.2d
836 (1971).
66 See Pendleton v. Nelson, 404 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1968).
67457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
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formant with respect to credibility questions upon
which a magistrate issuing a warrant must pass.
The court recognized that the rationale behind the
reliability of the informant prong of Aguilar was
to insure that search warrants are not issued on the
basis of idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture
which, passing through the criminal community, is
seized upon by an informant to ingratiate himself
to the police. But, because eyewitnesses by defini-
tion are not passing along idle rumor, since they
either have been the victims of the crime or have
otherwise seen some portion of it, the rationale be-
hind the reliability requirement of Aguilar has no
application. "A 'neutral and detached magistrate'
could adequately assess the probative value of an
eye-witness's information because, if it is reason-
able and accepted as true, the magistrate must be-
lieve that it is based upon first-hand knowledge."61
If any rule of general applicability can be discerned
from the federal cases, it is not that a citizen who
supplies information is automatically reliable re-
gardless of the qualitative value of the information
he supplies, but rather that, where the information
provided appears reasonably true, "lain informant
who alleges he is an 'eye-witness' to an actual crime
perpetrated demonstrates sufficient 'reliability' of
the person."6
None of the above should be taken to suggest
that there are no dangers involved in complete,
blind acceptance of the citizen-informant doctrine.
Courts must be on guard to protect the fourth
amendment rights of individuals against one who
would, under the guise of being a responsible citizen
who had witnessed a crime, supply false informa-
tion to the police to fulfill a personal vendetta. To
protect against fourth amendment infringements
resulting from such purposefully false information,
the details supplied by the asserted responsible
citizen should be, to a certain extent, so complete
as to be self-verifying. This is not to say that the
information should be sufficient to generate self-
verification under Spinelli's assessment of Draper,70
68 Id. at 1238-39.
69 McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.
1969). See also United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579,
581 (4th Cir. 1971) (eyewitness); United States v.
Mahler 442 F 2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1971) (vic-
tim); United States v. Wilcox, 437 F.2d 52, 54-55 (Sth
Cir. 1971) (eyewitness); Scbnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d
1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1970) (victim); Trimble v. United
States, 369 F.2d 950, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (victim);
Coyne v. Watson, 282 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D. Ohio
1967), a.ff'd mem., 392 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1968) (unidenti-
fied eyewitness).
70 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
for such a demand would, by definition, render
reliability considerations unnecessary. However,
the fact that information is offered by an ordinary
citizen, coupled with a tender of information in
sufficient detail so as to reasonably avoid the
appearance of fabrication, is enough to create
probable cause. "In sum, the internal content of the
affidavit intriniscally proves the truth of the
'responsible' citizen's word.""
A suitable benchmark for determining the cir-
cumstances in which the citizen's word should be
taken as true is found in United States v. Unger.72
The defendant was found guilty of possessing
unregistered firearms which were seized pursuant
to a warrant obtained by the Chicago policeY3
The warrant application stated that an unnamed
citizen, while working in the basement of an
apartment building, had occasion to observe a cache
of weapons through an opening in an enclosed
locker. Because of his military experience, he was
able to identify the weapons for the police. He also
pointed out the building in question for the police
and drew a diagram of the basement location of
the locker.
Upholding the trial judge's denial of a motion to
suppress, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit analyzed the impact of Harris upon the
law governing search warrants and concluded by
finding that, in the context of a citizen-informant
situation, the information in the complaint was
sufficiently self-verifying to attest to the citizen's
reliability. Judge Duffy's opinion announced that,
although a police officer's opinion of the reliability
of a citizen-informant was alone insufficient to
show probable cause, when coupled with informa-
tion in a complaint which attested to its own
integrity by the specificity with which it was
stated and some degree of corroboration, a warrant
could properly issue.74
71 United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579, 581 (4th
Cir. 1971). See also United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d
1283, 1286 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Evans, 447
F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1971).
22469 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1972).
73 As often occurs in cases of this nature, Unger
evolved from an investigation conducted by local police
who, upon discovering a federal violation, referred their
findings to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arms. Because referrals of this nature generally take
place after the contraband is seized, the federal govern-
ment is unable to supervise the warrant procedure and
must take the warrant as it finds it.
74 469 F.2d at 1287. That some degree of corrobora-
tion is necessary for a citizen's tip to generate probable
cause, even in the jurisdiction in which the citizen-in-
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While courts should demand an acceptable level
of detail in the information supplied, there are
several other factors effectuating the design of the
fourth amendment in the citizen-informant con-
text. These factors are manifested in a number of
considerations militating against the knowing
transmission of false information to the police.
Because a citizen who supplies false information
about a crime subjects himself to potential criminal
and civil penalties, a variety of sanctions exists to
deter a vindictive tender of misinformation.
False information given to a federal agent for
purposes of initiating a criminal investigation
may subject the supplier to criminal prosecutionY5
Moreover, some states, by a number of differently
labeled statutes, make the false report of criminal
activity punishable as a misdemeanory 6 Therefore,
criminal penalties await one who would purpose-
fully give false information of illegal conduct.
Similarly, a tender of false information may subject
the supplier to pecuniary liability. While false
information given to police officers may be in-
sufficient to support a civil cause of action for false
formant doctrine was founded, is made apparent by
People v. Zimnicki, 29 Cal. App. 3d 577, 105 Cal. Rptr.
614 (1972).
75 There is a conflict in the circuits as to whether
supplying false information to the F.B.I. is cognizable
under the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C.
§1001 (1970). Compare United States v. Adler, 380
F.2d 917 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006 (1967)
(finding offense) wil Friedman v. United States, 374
F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967). Significantly, both courts were
particularly concerned with whether the prosecution of
false information of this nature would inhibit citizens
from supplying information to the police and, thereby,
stultify the desirable resulting effects. Different con-
clusions on this subject were in no small part responsible
for the conflicting results. But see Note, 5 HouSTON L.
REv. 548, 553 (1968) ("The affirmative giving of false
information, initiated knowingly and willfully, clearly
falls within the prohibition of Section 1001.") Cf. Bry-
son v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 71 & n.4 (1969) (ap-
proving Adler analysis and leaving open question of
whether Friedman is good law).7
1 E.g., IL. REV. STAT, Ch. 38, §26-1 (1972), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when
he knowingly:
(5) Transmits in any manner to any peace officer,
public officer or public employee a report to the
effect that an offense has been committed, knowing
at the time of such transmission that there is no
reasonable ground for believing that such an offense
has been committed.
See also Azsz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §13-962 (1956) (malicious
procurement of warrant for arrest without probable
cause); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 §150 (1957) (false state-
ments, etc., to peace or police officers); WAsH. Rv.
CODE ANN. §9.62.010 (1961) (malicious prosecution-
abuse of process).
imprisonment if the ensuing arrest based on the
information proves improper, it may create a
litigious issue under state law.7 Thus, the expense
of potential litigation, like possible criminal
punishment, stands as a deterrent to false reports
of crime.
In light of the inherent reliability of citizen
information and the safeguards against its abuse,
sound policy reasons dictate total acceptance of the
citizen-informant doctrine. The interest that the
fourth amendment is designed to protect is,
according to Justice Cardozo, "the social need
that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of
office."7 8 Permitting a police officer to act upon
information supplied by a responsible citizen,
whether victim or bystander, will surely not result
in his flouting the law by the insolence of office.
The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the "obligation of all citizens to aid in en-
forcing the criminal laws."7 9 And Mr. Justice
White has warned that "[n]either the ordinary
citizen nor the confessed criminal should be dis-
couraged from reporting what he knows to the
authorities and from lending his aid to secure
evidence of crime."' 0 In this regard, courts have
countenanced and encouraged the use of paid
informants and undercover agents since time
immemorial." The responsible citizen who presents
1 See Odorizzi v. A.O. Smith Corp., 452 F.2d 229,
231-32 (7th Cir. 1971); Green v. No. 35 Check Ex-
change, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 2d 25, 222 N.E.2d 133 (1966);
Shelton v. Barry, 328 Il1. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697
(1946). Another possible basis for imposing liability is
malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Sears Roebuck Co. v.
Alexander, 252 Ala. 122,39 So. 2d 570 (1949); Humbert
v. Knutson, 224 Ore. 133, 354 P.2d 826 (1960); Peoples
Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Newhoff, 56 Tenn. App.
346,407 S.W.2d 190 (1966).
78 People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 17, 150 N.E. 585,
589, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).7
9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,481 (1966). The
Court long ago recognized that the citizen has a pro-
tected right to supply information to police officials. See
In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895):
It is the duty and the right, not only of every
peace officer of the United States, but of every citi-
zen, to assist in prosecuting, and in securing the
punishment of, any breach of the peace of the
United States. It is the right, as well as the duty, of
every citizen, when called upon by the proper offi-
cer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in uphold-
ing the laws of his country. It is likewise his right
and his duty to communicate to the executive
officers any information which he has of the com-
mission of an offense against those laws.
See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695
(1972).
9o Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 212 (1964)
(White, J., dissenting).
81 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,308-09 (1967);
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the police with evidence of a crime should be no
less encouraged, for "it is no part of the policy
underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to discourage citizens from aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals."8
Unfortunately, contemporary disillusionment
rides rampant over the apathy of the citizenry
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir.
1950), aj'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Cf. White v. United
States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Bush v. United States, 375
F.2d 602,604-05 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.).
8" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488
(1971).
toward becoming "involved" by reporting a crime
to the police. If law enforcement officials are un-
necessarily prevented from effectively responding
to the pleas of citizens, apathy will grow and the
duty of the citizen to aid in law enforcement will
remain a paper obligation. Therefore, it is time to
lay to rest any misconception concerning the re-
liability of an eyewitness to, or victim of, a crime
for purposes of generating probable cause to search.
This would not make the term "citizen" a magic
word to be mechanically inserted in all warrant
applications, but would insure judicial cognizance
of practical considerations and modem realities
in the administration of criminal justice.
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